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Abstract
The behaviour of a multiproduct profit seeking monopolist is evaluated vis à vis that of a
social planner, in a model where there is a continuum of consumers characterized by different
marginal willingness to pay for quality. When the market is completely covered, the monopolist
undersupplies all qualities as long as their number is finite. When quality becomes continuous,
the richest consumer is provided with the socially optimal quality. Under the alternative
assumption of partial market coverage, the monopolist supplies the same qualities as the social
planner, restricting though total output. Finally, it turns out that, for a given number of varieties,
under partial market coverage the monopolist can make at least as good as under full market
coverage, so that she prefers to distort quantity rather than quality.
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1. Introduction
The issue of evaluating the behaviour of a profit seeking monopolist under vertical product
differentiation, as compared to the social optimum, has been the focus of several influential
papers. Spence (1975, 1976) and Sheshinski (1976) have established that, although the
monopolist tends to restrict output for a given quality, she introduces a bias in the provision of
quality for a given output level, since in selecting quality the private monopolist takes into
account the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer, while a social planner would take into
account that of the average consumer. Thus, the monopolist ends up undersupplying quality for
a given output level if the average consumer’s valuation for quality is higher than the marginal
consumer’s, and viceversa.
The monopolist may offer several qualities of the same good in order to extract more
consumer surplus. This is the subject of the contributions due to Mussa and Rosen (1978), Itoh
(1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), and Besanko et al. (1987). A conclusion common to all these
authors is that the monopolist resorts to an enlargement of the quality spectrum, as compared
to the social optimum, as a screening device which enables her to discriminate among consumers.
In particular, it has been shown that with either (i) two types of consumers (rich-poor) and two
qualities (high-low) or (ii) with a continuum of consumers and qualities, the richest consumers,
i.e., those with the highest valuation for quality, are provided with the socially optimal quality,
while the poorest ones buy a suboptimal quality (for an illustrative argument, see Tirole, 1988,
p.150). The above contributions, though, leave largely unanswered the following questions: If
there exixts a continuum of consumers characterized by different incomes and thus different
marginal willingness to pay for quality, what kind of distortion shall the multiproduct monopolist
prefer to introduce in the market? Will she exploit exclusively the quality distortion or
alternatively a restriction in output, or rather a mix of both?
In order to provide an answer, I shall adopt here a model which respects the general
assumptions made in Mussa and Rosen (1978) as for technology and consumer tastes.
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Considering a continuum of consumers characterized by different valuation for quality, under
the assumption of full market coverage I show that, as long as the the quality spectrum of the
privatemonopolist is discrete, i.e., the numberof varieties beingprovided is finite, themonopolist
undersupplies all qualities. Furthermore, the extent to which she distorts quality is inversely
related to the marginal willingness to pay, both for a given number of varieties and as their
number increases, so that one can rather paradoxically conclude that rich consumers would
favourably consider product proliferation, while the opposite holds for poor consumers.
Then, it is shown that if the monopolist only partially serves the market, she offers the
same qualities that would be supplied by a social planner aiming at the maximization of social
welfare. In such a situation, though, the monopolist produces only half the output of the social
planner, both overall and for each variety. Finally, it appears that the monopolist is at least as
well off by restricting output than she is by serving all the market, so that she should be expected
to exert her monopoly power so as to exclude some individuals from consumption rather than
providing them with a range of suboptimal qualities.
2. The setting
Consider a monopolistic market for a vertically differentiated good where the firm
supplying the good may be thought of as being alternatively run by a social planner taking care
of social surplus or by a profit seeking monopolist. I shall compare the behaviour of these two
agents assuming they provide the same number of varieties, n. Consumers are uniformly
distributed with unit density over the interval so that the total number of
individuals is normalised to 1. Parameter represents consumer’s marginal willingness to pay
for quality, and it may be interpreted as the reciprocal of the marginal utility of nominal income,
or money (Tirole, 1988, pp.96-7). Each consumer buys one unit of the variety of the product
maximizing the net surplus he obtains, provided that the latter is non-negative:
[θ, θ], θ = θ + 1,θ > 0,
θ
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where qi is the quality of variety i and pi is the price charged by the monopolist for that quality.
Production involves variable costs only:
where xi is the quantity produced and t is a positive parameter. Hence, if marginal cost pricing
is considered, it is possible to define the range of consumers’ preferred qualities as the interval
(see Cremer and Thisse, 1994).
2.1. Full market coverage
Under the full market coverage assumption, condition (1) holds as an equality for the
poorest consumer, while it holds as a strict inequality for any other individual. The main features
of the behaviour of the social planner and the private monopolist as far as the provision of product
quality is concerned are summarized in the following
PROPOSITION 1. As long as the number of varieties is finite, the profit seeking monopolist
strictly undersupplies all qualities as compared to the social optimum. As the number of varieties
tends to infinity, the highest quality she offers tends to coincide with the socially optimal one,
while the difference between her lowest quality and the social planner’s lowest quality is
increasing in the number of varieties and in the limit it is equal in size to the whole range of
consumers’ preferred qualities.
PROOF. In order show what is stated in the above Proposition, I shall proceed by induction.
Hence, assume first that a single quality is supplied. The objective of the social planner is the
U = θqi − pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2...n , (1
C = tqi
2
xi, i = 1, 2...n , (2
[θ/2t , θ/2t]
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maximization of social welfare, defined as the sum of profit and consumer surplus:
It can be quickly verified that the price level is irrelevant as for the problem described in (3),
since it can only redistribute surplus from the consumers to the producer or viceversa, without
modifying the overall level of welfare.1 Thus, from the first order condition of (3) w.r.t q, I
obtain
i.e., the social planner locates her product exactly in the midpoint of the spectrum of consumers’
preferred qualities, as it also happens in spatial models à la Hotelling (see Bonanno, 1987, and
Lambertini, 1995).
Consider now the problem faced by a profit-maximizing monopolist, whose objective
function is:
max
q
sw = ⌠⌡θ
θ
(θq − tq2)dθ. (3
qsp =
θ − 1
4t
, (4
pim = p − tq2. (5
1. Obviously, the same cannot be expected to hold under partial market coverage, since
in such a case a price change brings about a change in quantity as well.
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Thederivativew.r.t. price is alwayspositive. Consequently, themonopolist will set the maximum
price consistent with the assumption of full market coverage, i.e., the price at which the poorest
consumer gives up all his surplus to purchase the good, Accordingly, the profit function
can be rewritten as follows:
which is concave and single-peaked, with the maximum at that is the quality preferred
by the poorest consumer. This allows to conclude that when a single variety is available, the
monopolist undersupplies quality as compared to the social optimum, and the "distance"
amounts to one half of the interval of consumers’ preferred qualities.
Assume now that two varieties are being supplied, qH>qL>0, produced at costs
i=H, L. Market demands are given by:
The objective function of the profit-seeking monopolist and the social planner are, respectively:
and
p = θq .
pim = θq − tq2, (6
qm = θ/2t ,
qsp − q m = 1/4t
Ci = tqi2xi,
xH = θ −
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
; xL =
(pH − pL)
qH − qL
− (θ − 1). (7
pim = (pH − tqH2)xH + (pL − tqL2)xL; (8
sw = ⌠⌡θ
h
(θqL − tqL2)dθ + ⌠⌡h
θ
(θqH − tqH2)dθ. (9
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Let’s take into account the problem of the private monopolist. Provided that pL is such that the
poorest consumer is indifferent between purchasing or not, the price of the high quality good
can be obtained from the first order condition (FOCs) derived from (8). Thus, equilibrium
qualities are univocally determined by the FOCs of (8) w.r.t. qH and qL, with
and Solving then the social planner’s problem yields and
It immediately appears that the monopolist undersupplies both qualities, with
and i.e., the "distance" between varieties in the high quality
segment of the market amounts to one quarter of the range of consumers’ preferred qualities,
while it amounts to three quarters in the low quality segment. Furthermore, the degree of
differentiation adopted by the profit-seeking monopolist is twice as wide as that adopted by the
social planner, due to the the monopolist’s attempt to extract as much consumer surplus as
possible by enhancing differentiation beyond the socially preferable level. This, coupled with
the fact that the monopolist undersupplies quality since by assumption she cannot restrict output,
yields the result observed here.
The same problem can be easily reformulated in the case of three varieties, where the
private monopolist supplies and while the
social planner produces and Subscript M
indicates the intermediate quality. As compared to the previous case, enlarging the number of
varieties leads to (i) an increase in the degree of differentiation under both market regimes; (ii)
an increase (decrease) in the differentiation degree between the low (high) qualities supplied in
the two market regimes, with the monopolist always undersupplying all qualities respect to the
social optimum.
Thus, I am now able to extend the analysis to the setting where n varieties are offered, or,
in other terms, where the distance between contiguous varieties tends to zero so that quality
becomes a continuous variable, with qH and qL indicating now the highest and lowest qualities
being supplied, respectively. In such a case,
qHm = (2θ − 1)/4t
qLm = (2θ − 3)/4t . qHsp = (4θ − 1)/8t
qLsp = (4θ − 3)/8t .
qHsp − qHm = 1/8t qLsp − qLm = 3/8t ,
qLm = (3θ − 5)/6t , qMm = (θ − 1)/2t qHm = (3θ − 1)/6t ,
qLsp = (6θ − 5)/12t , qMsp = (2θ − 1)/4t qHsp = (6θ − 1)/12t .
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Thus, when n varieties are available, the differentiation degrees under the two market regimes
are, respectively:
with and
The result in (13) implies that as the number of varieties tends to infinity, the social planner
provides each individual with his own most preferred quality, so that under social planning the
degree of differentiation coincides in the limit with the range of consumers’ preferences in terms
of quality.
As for the extent to which the profit maximizing monopolist undesupplies quality, observe
that
with
qH
m
=
nθ − 1
2nt
; qL
m
=
nθ − 2n + 1
2nt
; (10
qH
sp
=
2nθ − 1
4nt
; qL
sp
=
2nθ − 2n + 1
4nt
. (11
qH
m
− qL
m
= ∆qm = n − 1
nt
; qH
sp
− qL
sp
= ∆qsp = n − 1
2nt
, (12
∆q m/∆qsp = 2
lim
n → ∞
∆qm = 1
t
, lim
n → ∞
∆qsp = 1
2t
. (13
qH
sp
− qH
m
= ∆qH =
1
4nt
=

1
2n


1
2t
 ; qLsp − qLm = ∆qL =
2n − 1
4nt
=

2n − 1
2n


1
2t
 , (14
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This states that as the number of varieties tends to infinity, the monopolist ends up supplying
the socially optimal highest quality, while she undersupplies the lowest quality to an extent
equal to the size of the whole spectrum of consumers’ preferences.2 As emphasized by Besanko
et al. (1987, p.749), "the essence of the monopolist’s quality distortion is that the quality levels
provided to some groups of consumers are distorted so as to protect the higher profitability of
sales to other groups". Q.E.D.
2.2. Partial market coverage
Here, condition (1) is allowed to be violated for a non empty set of consumers. The
behaviour of the private monopolist and the social planner in such circumstances is summarized
by
PROPOSITION 2. For a given number of varieties, the monopolist supplies the same qualities
as the social planner, while producing half the output of the social planner, both overall and for
each variety. When the number of varieties tends to infinity, the social planner serves all the
market, while the monopolist serves only the upper half.
PROOF. Again, I proceed by induction. First, consider a monopolist who is only partially
serving the market, selling a single variety. The demand for her product is:
lim
n → ∞
∆qH = 0; lim
n → ∞
∆qL =
1
2t
. (15
2. Analogously, it could also be shown that, as n increases, the difference between the
monopolist’s quality and the corresponding social planner’s one, shrinks as
one moves from the bottom to the top of the quality range.
qisp − qim, i ∈]L , H[,
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so that the monopolist’s profit function is:
Observe that, potentially, the monopolist could choose not to exclude any individual from
consumption by setting the price-quality ratio below so as to serve the entire market. If this
doesnot obtainsat equilibrium, it implicitly means that themonopolist prefersquantity restriction
to quality distortion. Optimal quality and price can be obtained by solving the first order
conditions (it can be easily shown that second order conditions are also satisfied):
yielding and The equilibrium quantity is and profit amounts
to It is easily shown that a social planner maximizing welfare would set the same
quality as the profit maximizing monopolist, producing though 3 This is due to the
fact that the average valuation of quality icrements coincides with the marginal one (Spence,
1975, p.419). The latter is given by the derivative of price w.r.t. quality:
x = θ − p
q
, (16
pim = (p − tq2)x . (17
θ,
∂pim
∂q = tp +
p 2
q 2
− 2θqt = 0; (18
∂pim
∂p = θ −
2p
q
+ qt = 0; (19
p m = 2θ2/(9t) qm = θ/(3t). xm = θ/(3t)
pim = θ3/(27t).
qsp = 2θ/3.
3. In this setting the social welfare function is defined as in (3) above, but for the integration
limits, which are now p/q and .θ
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The average valuation is obtained as follows:
The two magnitudes coincide because the demand function is linear (see Spence, 1975,
pp.421-2). The same considerations obviously apply to the multiproduct setting.
Focus now on the case where more than one quality is produced, and define
and i=1, 2...n. In the case of two varieties, I obtain:
and so on as the number of varieties increases. Extending the analysis to n varieties, the following
results obtain:
∂p
∂q =
θ
2
+ qt . (20
1
x
⌠⌡p /q
θ ∂p
∂q dθ =
θ
2
+ qt . (21
Xm = ∑
i
xi
m
,
Xsp = ∑
i
xi
sp
,
qH
m
= qH
sp
=
2θ
5t ; qL
m
= qL
sp
=
θ
5t ; (22
Xm =
2θ
5 =
Xsp
2
, xi
m
=
θ
5 =
xi
sp
2
, i = H , L , (23
qi
m
= qi
sp
=
iθ
t(2n + 1), i = 1, 2...n ; (24
Xm =
nθ
2n + 1
=
Xsp
2
; xi
m
=
Xm
n
=
xi
sp
2
, i = 1, 2...n . (25
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Hence,
so that as the number of varieties tends to infinity the private monopolist serves the richer half
of the market, while the social planner serves all consumers4. Q.E.D.
Compare now the profits accruing to the monopolist under the alternative assumptions of
partial and complete market coverage. Under full market coverage the overall profit amounts
to
while under partial market coverage it corresponds to
where subscripts fc and pc stand for full and partial market coverage, respectively. It can be
shown that for all admissible values of parameter θ. An illustrative example is now
provided. Consider the case of a single variety, and compare the profits associated with the two
alternative assumptions:
lim
n → ∞
Xm =
1
2
; lim
n → ∞
Xsp = 1, (26
pifc
m
= ∑
i
pii
m
, pii
m
=
θn 2(θ − 2) + 2n (2i − 1) − 2i(i − 1) − 1
4n 3t
, (27
pipc
m
= ∑
i
pii
m
, pii
m
=
iθ3(2n − i + 1)
2t(2n + 1)3 , (28
pipc
m ≥ pifc
m
4. This results was already highlighted by Mussa and Rosen (1978, p.313) for the case
where low income consumers cannot buy any variety by definition, i.e., θ = 0.
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for all In particular, condition (25) holds as a strict inequality for all values of except
for which it holds as an equality. Analogous calculations are needed to obtain the same
results when more than one product is supplied. The calculations concerning the case in which
n=10 are provided in the Appendix. Accordingly, the following relevant corollary holds:
COROLLARY 1. For a given number of varieties, if the profit seeking monopolist is given the
option between restricting output and biasing qualities, she prefers to exert her monopoly power
by excluding the poorer individuals from consumption.
3. Conclusions
The behaviour of a multiproduct monopolist in a market for vertically differentiated goods
has been described. I have shown that if the multiproduct monopolist is assumed to serve the
entire market with goods of different qualities, she undersupplies all qualities as compared to
the social optimum, as long as the number of varieties is finite. When the latter becomes infinite,
or equivalently when the quality range being supplied becomes continuous, the monopolist
supplies the socially optimal quality exclusively to the consumer with the highest valuation for
quality, while increasing the distortion in the varieties offered to poorer consumers. Thus the
results already highlighted by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and other authors emerges here as the
asymptotic result of a discrete model. Furthermore, when the alternative assumption of partial
market coverage is adopted, I have shown that the profit seeking monopolist supplies the same
qualities as the social planner, though she produces half the output associated with social
planning. Finally, the comparison between the monopolist’s profit in the two settings yields the
result that under partial market coverage she is at least as well off as under full market coverage,
θ3
27t
≥
(θ − 1)2
4t
(29
θ ≥ 1. θ
θ = 3,
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given the number of products. Consequently, one can conclude that if the monopolist can choose
the type of distortion, she prefers to restrict output rather than providing customers with
suboptimal qualities.
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Appendix
Assume ten varieties are being supplied by the profit maximizing monopolist. From
expression (10), it can be checked that must be greater than 19/10 for the lowest quality,
to be positive. Compare then the total profits accruing to the monopolist in the two alternative
settings, i.e., full and partial market coverage, as defined by expressions (27) and (28),
respectively. In the case under analysis , the difference between the two amounts to:
which simplifies to
It is immediate to verify that the above difference is non-negative for all and it
is nil in correspondence of Besides, straightforward calculations are needed to show
that the critical value of for which the monopolist is indifferent between partial and full market
coverage (which we have seen to correspond to 3 for n=1 and 21/10 for n=10) is decreasing in
the number of varieties, so that as the latter becomes arbitrarily large, the profit seeking
monopolist strictly prefers not to serve the entire market.
qLm,θ
pipc
m
− pifc
m
=
55θ3
1323t −
100θ3 − 200θ2 + 133
400t , (a1
pipc
m
− pifc
m
=
(10θ − 21)2 (220θ − 399)
529200t . (a2
θ ∈]19/10, ∞[,
θ = 21/10.
θ
14
References
Bonanno, G. (1987), Location Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence, Review of
Economic Studies, 54, pp.37-46.
Besanko, D., S. Donnenfeld and L. White (1987), Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects
and Remedies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, pp.743-68.
Cremer, H., and J.-F. Thisse (1994), Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly,
International Economic Review, 35, pp.613-33.
Itoh, M. (1983), Monopoly, Product Differentiation and Economic Welfare, Journal of
Economic Theory, 31, pp.88-104.
Lambertini, L. (1995), A Note on Spatial Monopoly, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze
Economiche e Commerciali, forthcoming.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley (1984), Monopoly with Incomplete Information, Rand Journal of
Economics, 15, pp.171-96.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen (1978), Monopoly and Product Quality, Journal of Economic Theory,
18, pp.301-17.
Sheshinski, E. (1976), Price, Quality and Quantity Regulation in Monopoly, Econometrica, 43,
pp.127-37.
Spence,M. (1975), Monopoly, Quality and Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics, 6, pp.417-29.
Spence, M. (1976), Product Differentiation and Welfare, American Economic Review, 66,
pp.407-14.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
15
